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INSTABILITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD
A MODEL FOR EVALUATION
AND DECISION MAKING

BY

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The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have increased the likelihood of instability. These factors have also increased American flexibility in dealing with these instabilities. Instabilities can be classified according to their causes, their effects, and their solutions. Once classified, a model can be developed to aid in devising American responses to a particular instability. This model uses the four elements of national power; economic, political, diplomatic, and military; to develop a coordinated, long term national plan aimed at alleviating the causes of a particular instability.

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INSTABILITY IN THE POST-COLD WAR WORLD

A MODEL FOR EVALUATION AND DECISION MAKING

AN INDIVIDUAL STUDY PROJECT

by

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The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War have increased the likelihood of instability. These factors have also increased American flexibility in dealing with these instabilities. Instabilities can be classified according to their causes, their effects, and their solutions. Once classified, a model can be developed to aid in devising American responses to a particular instability. This model uses the four elements of national power; economic, political, diplomatic, and military; to develop a coordinated, long term national plan aimed at alleviating the causes of a particular instability.

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

INTRODUCTION

The demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War
have significantly changed the strategic problem for the United
States. The loss of a central focus for defense preparations and
the evaporation of THE THREAT has left a generation of national
security experts and military officers, schooled in the catechism
of threat based planning, adrift in seemingly uncharted seas.[1]
It seems that the only certainties in this post-Cold War world
are uncertainty and instability.

The increase in uncertainty and instability has received
widespread comment and discussion, mostly focusing on the
increased expanse of territory open to these turmoils or on the
growth in their numbers. However, growth and expansion are not
the most significant changes. The real change is in America's
range of responses. The demise of the USSR has restored
flexibility to the development of American policy.[2] That
flexibility is at the heart of the conundrum in dealing with
instability. The world that allowed Robert McNamara to say
"There is no longer any such thing as strategy, only crisis
management"[3] is gone. Where before we reacted to the
possibility or reality of Soviet actions in response to an
instability, we now are forced to react to the actual instability
and, perhaps, develop a strategy to address the reality of
instabilities throughout the world. In an attempt to develop
workable responses to instabilities this paper offers a method of

classifying and assessing an instability and a proposed model for developing possible United States responses.

INSTABILITY

What is instability? Webster's defines it as a "lack of stability; lack of firmness ... inconstancy; fickleness; mutability"[4] with a "tendency to react violently or explosively."[5] Converting this sterile definition into one applicable to the internal condition of a nation produces:

> The internal political, economic, and social condition
> of a nation-state characterized by infirmness,
> inconsistency, and mutability. This condition has the
> potential to react violently or explosively when
> exposed to certain stimuli.

Armed with this definition, a general classification of instability can be developed using the categories of: cause, effect, and solution.

CAUSES

Instability has a host of causes. These causes all tend to be interrelated and usually interact to create a synergistic effect.[6] This synergism serves to acerbate the turmoil and complicate the solution to a particular situation. The major causes of instability can be organized under the following four categories:

Disparate Economic Development

The underlying cause of instability is the unequal distribution of economic activity and development throughout the

world.[7] Although the overt cause of the turmoil may be one of

the local issues listed under the other categories, below, the

"major disparities of wealth and opportunity that separate the

industrialized nations and the developing world"[8] provide the

incubator in which the tumult is nurtured. The degree of this

economic disparity intensifies the situation. Helmut Schmidt

maintains that "hunger, poverty, and destitute conditions cause

the problem."[9] Every region and nation has economic problems

which foster dissatisfaction and unrest. Even in the United

States, George Bush was lost his job when his economic policies

failed to restore jobs and hope to the American people. While in

Europe, the economic failures of the communist system and the

knowledge of these failures, when compared with the images of

capitalist success shown daily on western television, led to the

ultimate disintegration of the communist states.[10]

When the populace barely ekes out an existence and has no

hope for improvement, this dissatisfaction and unrest can lead to

an explosion. This happened in Algeria, where severe

unemployment, chronic housing shortages, and a depressed economy

preclude the hope of a better life. In response to government

economic policies rioting tore the country's major cities. The

brutal suppression of these riots by the military led to the

formation of an Islamic fundamentalist party violently opposed to

the current government.[11]

Religious Strife

Conflicts based on religious differences predate the Bible and, if past is truly prologue, will continue to be a prime source of trouble for the world. In the current strategic environment religious animosity affects all areas of the globe and has supporters within all of the major religious groups.

The specter of Moslem fundamentalism and militant Islam has overshadowed the world since the end of the 1970s and received extensive coverage by various analysts. The problem has certainly not receded. The theocracy in Iran is as hostile to the West and any nation which is seen as a western ally as it ever was. All of the nations of the Middle East have a problem with Islamic militants. The government of Egypt has a continuing blood feud with the Moslem zealots. Having engineered Sadat's assassination, these zealots continue to seek Mubarak's overthrow and the imposition of the Sharia, Islamic religious law, on Egyptian society. In Jordan King Hussein has essentially been co-opted by the militants who have gained control of the Jordanian parliament. Morocco, Tunisia, Saudi Arabia, and even Syria must placate fundamentalist groups. As cited earlier, Algeria saw the electoral victory of the FIS and resorted to a military coup to prevent the loss of power to the reigning FLN, an action akin to putting a lid on a simmering pot without turning off the heat.

The power of the religious community affects the decision making processes in every Moslem country. It also presents a

path for the rise of demagogues inimical to the United States.[12] And looming over all these problems of fundamentalism is the schism between the Sunni and Shiite, an additional destabilizing factor and further cause for intra-Islam violence.

Religious strife also haunts the Indian subcontinent. Militant Sikhs in the Punjab and militant Hindus throughout the country plague India. Religious animosity between Moslems and Hindus caused the original formation of Pakistan out of India and contributes a significant amount to the fury and intractability in the relations between the two countries.[13]

In Bosnia-Herzegovina the Serbs, a mainly Christian culture, use their religion as a partial justification for their "ethnic cleansing" of the Bosnians, a predominately Moslem culture. The clash of religions is also central to the battles between the Moslem Azeris and the Christian Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh. In Moldava religious as well as ethnic reasons fuel the battles between the Greek Orthodox Moldavians and the Russian Orthodox Russians of the trans-Dnester region.[14]

Even Buddhism, renowned as a religion of peace, figures in conflicts. The low level civil unrest in Tibet is focused mainly on the persecution of the Dalai Lama and his followers by the atheistic government of the People's Republic of China. In Sri Lanka the religious differences between the Hindu Tamils and the Buddhist Sinhalese provide further incentive for maiming thy neighbor.[15]

Ethnic Conflict

It seems that the historical process has been reversed in the last decade of the 20th century. Civilization is normally portrayed as the advance from simple social systems to systems with more complex social organizations: moving from family, through the tribe and the city-state, to the present nation-state organization. A cursory review of trends in the last five years, especially since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, indicates a move back to tribal societies. Indeed, the dynamic that tore the Soviet Union into fifteen, and possibly more, countries was part of this trend. The level of ethnic chauvinism has certainly surged or, more accurately, resurged in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet territory. Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia have disappeared because of insoluble ethnic conflicts. This ethnic chauvinism is also present to a greater or lesser degree throughout the old Soviet world. Russia itself has nineteen autonomous regions, based mostly on tribal/ethnic settlement patterns, each wanting a greater degree of power and political control over their fate, while simultaneously seeking to dominate any minorities within their territory.[16]

However, the ethnic problem is not limited to the carcass of a dead empire. These conflicts are spread throughout the world. In Asia the Sri Lankan conflict, though containing a religious element, is primarily fueled by ethnic hatred, as is the revolt of the Kurds against the Turks, Iranians, and Iraqis. Africa has a multitude of tribal/ethnic wars. The best publicized of these

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is the trilateral tribal conflict in South Africa, wher. the Zulus, the Afrikaaners, and the Xhosa are jousting for primacy. Even North America has the seeds of ethnic conflict in Canada, Mexico, and, perhaps, the United States itself.[17]

Drive For Freedom

The human soul "yearning to breathe free"[18] is also a source of instability. Maslow aptly explains this human tendency in showing the changing aspirations and needs of humans as they rise from a subsistence existence and stretch for something "more". The tumultuous events of the past dozen years show the effects of this basic desire for freedom. Solidarity's strikes at the Gdansk shipyard in 1980 may have been prompted by the government's price increases, but the decade long struggle of the Polish people to throw off their communist rulers was sustained by a strong desire for freedom. From the strikes of the early years; through the marcial law of the mid-decade; to the country-wide strikes, collapsing economy, and government disintegration at decade's end; the Polish people strove steadily for their freedom throughout the 1980s.[19]

This same drive is evident half a world away in Myanmar, nee' Burma. Here the Burmese people have struggled for five years to wrest their country from a military junta.[20] Despite bloody crackdowns and the jailing of all the effect:ve opposition leaders, the people have continued to press for freedom. In 1990, hoping to placate local and world opinion, the government held what it thought were tame elections. The people thought

otherwise and voted overwhelmingly for the establishment of a democratic government. Shocked into paralysis by the election results, the government didn't react immediately. However, using election records to find their opponents, the Junta eventually responded with even more repression. Despite continued oppression and disappointment, the Burmese people still struggle on for freedom.[21]

The example of Myanmar notwithstanding, freedom movements have been successful in the last few years. Many oppressive governments around the world have been liberalized. Inspired by these successes, other movements toward freedom and democracy have begun to emerge. Such movements in Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, and elsewhere press forward with varying degrees of success. This drive for freedom is likely to continue.

A dark side of this drive is the potential for mischief-making by political opportunists. Seeking ways to profit, either politically or economically, individuals or groups work to delegitimize the government and ruling class in a particular nation. Many revolutions throughout history have been co-opted by such opportunists, ranging from Napoleon in France and Lenin in Russia to the mullahs in Iran. The Serbian attempt to profit from the dissolution of Yugoslavia at the expense of their former compatriots is the most current example of this.[22]

EFFECTS

An instability which leads to nothing and creates no other turmoil or tumult is of no concern to the United States. It is

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also probably nonexistent. It is in the effects of instability that the problems, dangers, and possible opportunities lie. These potential effects offer an additional category of classification.

The principal question concerning the effects of instabilities is the possibility of contagion. Will the instability spread to neighboring nations and regions or will it only effect its host nation?

A prime example of a noncontagious instability is the Quebec crisis in Canada. Although the dissolution of the Canadian nation could have a deleterious effect on the United States and other Canadian allies,[23] there is no danger of the Quebecois chauvinism spreading to Louisiana and triggering a similar drive for autonomy there. These noncontagious (dare we say clean?) instabilities, however are not the rule.

A more typical instability in this regard exists in India. There the Sikh religious militancy has spread turmoil throughout the subcontinent. The growth of militancy in the mainstream Hindu population is primarily in response to the depredations of militant Sikhism. This Hindu militancy has not only fueled the continuing violence in the Punjab and prevented any reconciliation between the two Hindu sects, but has also sparked Hindu attacks on other religious groups. These attacks have primarily been against Moslems, but Christian churches have also been burnt.

Militant Hindus also provide support to the Tamil insurgents in Sri Lanka. Inevitably, these attacks against Indian Moslems serve to harden the animosity of the Pakistani Moslems against their perennial enemy. Further spreading the effects of the turmoil, the Sikhs have resorted to terrorist attacks on Indian people and property elsewhere in the world.[24]

Since most instabilities spread, the effects must be reviewed in relation to their consequences for their immediate neighbors, the world at large, and the United States in particular. Is the effect simply a refugee problem, similar to Kenya's tribulations from the Somali catastrophe, and only requiring assistance in dealing with the displaced people? Or are the effects something more sinister? It has long been a practice of states when faced with troubles at home to try and export the trouble. One of Secretary of State Seward's recommendation to President Lincoln was to start a war with England in order to prevent the secession of the Confederate States. This was also a prime motive for Argentina's seizure of the Falkland Islands. The ruling Junta needed to divert the Argentineans' attention from the country's rampant inflation, devastated economy, and general government incompetence. Invading the Falklands seemed to provide a safe and effective distraction.

Exportation of instabilities in the manner of Argentina presents a different problem for the United States and requires a significantly disparate response than that of helping the Kenyans

feed hungry Somalis. There is a fundamental truth in Janice Gross Stein's understated comment that "pressed at home and abroad, some countries will find the use of force attractive."[25]

SOLUTIONS

Having defined the causes of the instability and their probable effects, the question of a solution remains. The possible responses available to the United States, either singly or in harness with other countries and multilateral organizations provide yet another classification grouping.

Amenability

Will the situation be improved by attempts to address the instability? This should be a relatively easy question to answer. Either the problem is so complicated, deep seated, or intractable that no solution, short of allowing the instability to reach its inevitable and, probably, bloody conclusion, is available; or it isn't. Even if the outcome seems doomed to bloody failure some response, which at least mitigates the problem, probably exists. The United States deployment of forces to Somalia won't result in the creation of a strong, vibrant democracy in a flowering garden by year's end. It will however preserve the lives of thousands of Somalis.

Timeliness

There are no short term solutions to the problems causing instabilities around the world. As initially argued, the basic problem is grinding poverty and a lack of economic opportunity and growth. Fixing an economy destroyed by decades of either

communist mismanagement, political corruption, or general
ineptitude takes time, in some cases generations. The long term
nature of effective solutions must be recognized at the start.
This insures that no short term fix ends up creating a bigger
problem than existed before help arrived. The economic sanctions
imposed upon Haiti by the United States and the other members of
the Organization of American States (OAS) in response to the
ouster of President Aristide are a case in point. In an attempt
to reinstall Aristide the OAS sanctions have destroyed what
little economy Haiti had and have worsened the Haitian peoples'
economic and political lot.[26]

Understanding that the effort will be long term also fosters
the proper mindset in the nations providing the assistance and
those receiving it. That, hopefully, prevents the promotion of
unrealistic and unattainable goals. Failure to achieve the
unachievable could seriously undermine the morale of those
involved, lead to widespread disillusionment, and worsen instead
of improve the situation.

The nature of the decision-making process in the United
States and the rest of the developed world complicates the
development of long term solutions. Instead of addressing an
instability in its initial stages, the tendency is to
procrastinate, study the situation, discuss the options, and,
finally, to await developments. There is also an American
proclivity to wait until the crisis is in full bloom before
devoting any attention or resources to fixing the problem. These

traits are reflected in the painful and halting development of responses to the crises in Somalia and the Balkans.

Although, this procrastination does not preclude the development of long term solutions, it does tend to focus agencies on the short term need to do something (anything?) when decisions are finally reached. This short term focus in turn hinders the development of long term solutions by diverting the agencies' planning effort and fostering a short term mindset. Therefore, the need for long term planning solutions must be emphasized, because the tendencies to procrastinate and second-guess decisions will continue. This will shorten reaction times and require instantaneous action to treat the most egregious aspects of a particular instability.[27]

Means

The basic cause of an instability is grounded in the economic condition of a country. It follows, therefore, that economic development should be the basis for the long term solution. Plans should incorporate all of the available assets from national, multinational, nongovernmental, and private sector organizations and focus on developing a healthy, free market economy. Simply providing funds to local governments and elites or building industries which can't compete or sustain themselves is useless. The frustrating history of aid to sub-saharan Africa provides proof of this. Although long term, these plans should also provide the local populace with some sign of improvement in their daily lives within a relatively short period. Draconian

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economic actions like those employed in Algeria, should be avoided. The important consideration is to coordinate the economic programs with the political solutions to strengthen the government and the society, as well as the economy.

Improving the political structures within the country goes hand-in-hand with improving the economy. The two can prove mutually supporting as a more prosperous populace pushes for increased political control. Political pressure on the government can be used to move the government from authoritarian practices towards more democratic and open ones. This pressure can also encourage the government to institutionalize procedures to protect basic human rights within the bureaucracy, the security services, and the military. In El Salvador American and world political pressure forced democratic changes in the institutions and practices of the El Salvadoran government, including correcting its dismal record on human rights. This pressure was effective in helping end the civil war, bringing the formerly warring factions into the political arena, and developing a rudimentary democracy.[28]

It is also important to educate the people concerning democratic practices and their role in controlling the government. The importance of a free and open society to the development of a free enterprise economic system should be emphasized. Radio Free Europe was successful in communicating these ideas to Eastern Europe. Private sector organizations can also assist in this endeavor. For example, the efforts of the

AFL-CIO in supporting Solidarity's drive for democracy in Poland were very successful.

Diplomatic efforts can also assist in resolving the instability. International pressure can accomplish a number of objectives. As in El Salvador, it can be exerted to reduce any outside support for divisive elements within the target country. Diplomacy can also open up foreign markets for the country's products, energize other nations and organizations to provide aid and expertise, and provide additional pressure on the target country's government to liberalize its practices and procedures.

The appropriateness of military action is totally dependent on the particular characteristics of a given instability and is closely related to the question of how long the situation has been brewing. If military force is deci ed on it must be only a part of the immediate response and not viewed as a solution to the problem. The British experience in Northern Ireland clearly shows that military forces can only establish a semi-secure environment for the development of the long term economic and social improvements that really address the causes of the instability. Too long or prominent a commitment of military force risks shifting the peoples' attention from economic improvements to the presence of an "occupying army" and provides an inviting target for political opportunists. This very thing may be happening in Somalia now, where Somali politicians are seeking to incite the populace against the American forces.[29]

The Benefactors

Who should apply the solution? Those best able to ensure success is the immediate answer. Everyone is probably a more accurate response. Solving the problems that cause instability requires the efforts of individual states, regional alliances, and the United Nations. The question of who will lead and how the assistance will be applied is again dependent on the particular situation. The current Secretary General of the United Nations espouses a more active and dynamic approach to instability from his organization. The United States also desires more active involvement of coalitions and multinational organizations in addressing instabilities. However, not all nations and regions will welcome the United Nations. Also, the decision making processes and management capabilities of that organization may limit its usefulness in some situations. Certainly, the United Nations's past attitude towards Israel hinders its usefulness in the cause of Middle East peace. The UN resolution equating Zionism with racism is only one of the most prominent examples.[30]

DECISION DEVELOPMENT MODEL

To build on the pattern, developed above, a model to guide and assist decision making is needed. The model should prompt the decision maker to address each particular instability with regards to the ends desired, the way to reach those ends, and the means needed. A possible model, illustrated in Figures 1 through 5, and some considerations for its use are proposed below.

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
FIGURE 1: A Model For Decision Making

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Any decision to commit national power must first address the question of national interest and its level of intensity. The level of resource commitment and the magnitude of the United States' action in response to a specific instability should reflect the level of national interest impacted by the situation. The model does not determine what are national interests. It assumes that these have already been identified and are known to the decision maker. The data developed in the review outlined above should highlight wherecauses and effects diminish or augment these specific American interests. This should lead to the identification of the impact on American national interests and, in the determination of possible effects, the degree; i.e. survival, vital, major, or peripheral; of that these interests are effected.

An important consideration in developing an appreciation of a particular instability is the understanding that the degree of national interest intensity might change as the instability waxes and wanes. This is particularly true in instances where the media uncovers activities that outrage United States' public opinion. Yugoslavia is a good example of this. The Serbian-Croatian war was never presented as affecting significant United States' interests. However, as the Serbs embarked on a campaign to subdue Bosnia and as the brutality of that campaign increased, calls for United States intervention rose. Citing an American vital interest in resisting aggression and stopping "ethnic cleansing", various politicians and pundits put forth a moral

aspect of national interests that moved the Bosnian situation from a peripheral to a major interest. Further Serbian outrages could convince the American people that they have a vital interest in destroying a country that could commit such crimes against humanity. This consideration may well animate United States perceptions and, therefore policies in the future, especially if threats to the more traditional survival and vital interests of the United States continue to abate.[31]

After determining the degree of national interests involved in the instability, the model prompts for a description of the desired end state. Deciding on the end state provides clear objectives on which to focus national power. This should also prevent wasteful excursions. It should also further the development of long range solutions vice short range reactions that solve nothing. The world's response to the Ethiopian famine of 1983-1985 illustrates this. Food was sent to relieve the famine, but little was done to settle the civil war that caused the starvation. As a result the relief supplies became another weapon in the civil war and the famine problem was not eradicated.[32]

Having developed a desired outcome, the decision maker must decide on the elements of national power best suited to achieving that outcome. To do this the desired end state should be compared to the causes of the instability to determine what must be changed in the situation. The means selected should be those that best accomplish these changes. The model presents a series

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FIGURE 2: A Model For Decision Making: Economic Means

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of broad options. These are possible economic, political, diplomatic, and military action for all of the levels of national interest. However, if the decision maker chooses a military option for an instability affecting major or peripheral interests, the model requires a reevaluation of the intensity of national interests involved. The model assumes that employing military force, as opposed to using military units for humanitarian missions, means that a vital or survival interest is threatened. If this assumption is invalid the model requires a deliberate decision to override it.

The economic choices presented deal with macro approaches to the situation. The model prompts for decisions on the level of public and private activity, as well as, the role of multinational financial organizations such as the World Bank.

After establishing that the local environment is conducive to business activity, the private branch poses a number of questions. Should tax incentives for American corporations be instituted to encourage private sector investment? Will the United States government indemnify businesses for losses caused by bad investments made for political considerations? Will American companies have to observe United States' ethics, labor, and environmental laws while operating in the target country or will the local statutes take precedence?

The public branch requires consideration of the level of governmental control in the target country's economy and the methods of disbursing the American government's assistance. Among

the economic possibilities presented are: grants, government to government loans, and special tariff or tax considerations for local corporations dealing in the United States. The next decision is on how to distribute the aid. Should it be given to the government and doled out through its agencies, or should the aid go directly to the local citizenry? This leads to the need for controls to ensure that the aid is used for the improvement of the local economy, as a whole. Rampant corruption or diversion of aid can have severe repercussions in the donor nation, as well as, the target country.

The basic decision regarding multilateral organizations is whether to use them or not. In many cases this may not even be a consideration, because most developing countries already have some ties to these institutions. A point that must be considered, however, is the role of these organizations in the local economy. The harsh measures that have been imposed on some nations to please the World Bank have had severe political consequences for these countries. The purpose of developing an all encompassing, long-range approach to instabilities is to avoid, as much as possible, such counterproductive actions.[33]

Although the political branch of the model is concerned with development of democratic systems of government, it allows for the possibility that other forms of government are acceptable to the people of the target country. Sometimes, however, the local governments are neither democratic nor legitimate. In these

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
FIGURE 3: A Model For Decision Making: Political Means

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cases American support might be used to exert pressure for governmental reforms, or to develop alternatives to the present governing party.

Legitimate governments, democratic or not, provide a base from which to develop a more representative governing system. The model assumes that the United States is intent on encouraging democratic practices and beliefs in the local populace and instituting these practices in the government. In this vein the model presents a number of possible actions to bring this liberalization about. Educating the populace in the procedures and benefits of democracy, improving governmental functions and prestige, and developing alternative political parties are some possible actions.

Since human rights is central to democratic development, the model addresses this problem and prompts the decision maker to consider the complications that human rights concerns can have on the development of political legitimacy and stability. The planners should also look at the damage a lack of respect for human rights can do to the diplomatic stature of the target government.

The diplomatic branch of the model presents a number of options for identifying the role of American allies, regional organizations, and the United Nations in responding to instability.

**FIGURE 4:** A Model For Decision Making: Diplomatic Means

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Is the target government friendly to the United States? If not, some punitive options are sanctions, be they economic or diplomatic, and diplomatic isolation of the hostile state.

If the government is friendly the decision maker is prompted to implement other actions. Does an aggressor need to isolated? Should plans be made to deal with third nations who encourage the unstable elements? Are there regional problems that cause or contribute to instability in individual countries? These questions are not necessarily applicable to all, or even most, instabilities, but they should be answered if only to reduce the possible options and actions to a manageable level.

Once these questions are answered the model presents a number of possible ways diplomatic power can be used to improve the situation inside the target country. The most useful diplomatic contribution is in encouraging regional and multinational organizations to provide economic, military, and political assistance. However, diplomacy can also be used to improve trade relations and provide increased legitimacy to the government through conspicuous successes on the international stage.

The military force option should be relatively simple. Either the interests are sufficiently vital and the situation sufficiently violent that military action is required, or it isn't. However, there are complicating factors. One is, as described above, the vagaries surrounding the intensity of national interests. Others are the capability of the military to

FIGURE 5: A Model For Decision Making: Military Means

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respond rapidly and its obedience to the President's wishes, when compared to other national means. This makes the use of a military force very attractive to a President, even if the situation doesn't really require it.

Once the decision to use military action is made the model requires decisions on the length of time to commit forces and the level of force to commit. The force levels range from training assistance and advisory teams, through technical aid and security assistance programs, to the commitment of combat forces. These force level options are not mutually exclusive. No distinction is made between the application of air, ground, or sea power. Use of any of these forces commits the power and prestige of the United States and increases the risk to American interests from the instability. Developing plans which count on a clean, unencumbered use of military power is unrealistic. Additionally, this raises the specter of piecemeal commitment of force if the local situation fails to respond as desired.

Finally, the model shows the plans developed in the four Means branches discussed being integrated into a single plan of action. This plan is then compared to the desired end state and the instability's causes to ensure the plan address the reality of the instability and has promise of success. Admittedly, this model covers only the most obvious aspects of national power and then in a most superficial way. The purpose of this rudimentary model was not to construct a computer program that would provide a guaranteed answer to all of the problems abroad in the world,

but to provide a method to ensure that the basic questions were at least asked, if not answered at the very beginning of United States action in a developing country.

Conclusion

This paper has attempted to construct an orderly approach to the discussion of instabilities around the world. As the number of these instabilities increase, it is imperative that each one be evaluated on its own merits and any action undertaken to relieve the instability address the root causes, as well as their most egregious symptoms. That is why a clear depiction of the real causes of a particular instability and an understanding of the economic, religious, and ethnic complexities of the situation is needed. This clear appraisal of the causes should lead to an accurate forecast of the instabilities' effects on those around them and on United States' national interests. Understanding these causes and effects provides clues to organizing the proper course of action for responding to the instability. Also, understanding the instability's effects on United States' national interests helps determine the level of American effort required.

The decision model outlined above focused on addressing the four main elements of national power in constructing a single plan to apply to an instability. In developing a proper response, aimed at the true causes of the turmoil, all of the elements of power should be integrated from the very beginning. The complex problems causing various instabilities must not be

considered the sole purview of one element of national power or a particular fiefdom of the American bureaucracy. There are no such things as solely diplomatic, military, political, or economic problems. It follows, therefore, that there is no such thing as a solely diplomatic, military, political, or economic solution. It should also be evident that there is no such thing as a solely American solution, either. The classification system and the decision development model, both, require decisions based on the actions of other nations and multilateral organizations. The reason is obvious. The United States is not alone in the world and, just as everything is not America's fault, so everything is not America's responsibility to fix. Effective plans must integrate all of the available assistance from private parties, nation-states, and multinational organizations. This is the only sure way to provide the continuing economic development and political stability the world needs to get on with the business of living.

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